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Network Exposure and Excessive Use of Force: Investigating the Potential for Social 
Contagion of Police Misconduct 
 
Research Summary: This study investigates how a police officer’s exposure to peers accused of 
misconduct shapes their own involvement in excessive use of force. Drawing from 8,642 Chicago 
police officers named in multiple complaints, we reconstruct police misconduct ego-networks 
using civilian and department complaint records. Results show that officer involvement in 
excessive use of force complaints is predicted by having a greater proportion of co-accused with a 
history of such behaviors.  
 
Policy Implications: Findings suggest officers’ peers may serve as social conduits through which 
misconduct may be learned and transmitted. The removal of officers engaging in use of force, at 
least until problematic behaviors are addressed, appears to be critical to reducing department-wide 
complaints. Future studies should investigate how social networks shape police misconduct, and 
ways network analysis might be used to diffuse intervention strategies within departments. 
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 On the morning of October 5, 2018, the city of Chicago held its breath as a jury decided 
whether or not Chicago police officer Jason Van Dyke was guilty of murdering seventeen-year-
old Laquan McDonald. The case centered on police dashcam video footage that showed Van Dyke, 
and his partner, arriving on an active scene surrounding a knife-wielding McDonald (Davey and 
Smith, 2015). Within six seconds of exiting his car, Van Dyke commanded McDonald to drop the 
knife; when McDonald failed to comply, Van Dyke shot McDonald 16 times, continuing to fire 
his weapon after McDonald was already laying on the ground. The shooting itself happened four 
years earlier, two months after Michael Brown was shot in Ferguson, MO and a month before 
Tamar Rice was shot in Cleveland, OH, but the video was released only after litigation filed by an 
investigative journalist. The release of the video sparked protests across the city and the nation, 
leading to the firing of the Chicago Police Superintendent, the failed reelection of the Cook County 
State’s Attorney, and a massive inquiry into the patterns and practices of the Chicago Police 
Department (Davey and Smith, 2015; Department of Justice, 2017). Van Dyke was charged with 
first-degree murder. The city braced for the verdict, with residents and police fearing an acquittal 
might lead to protests and unrest similar to those after the acquittal of Los Angeles police officers 
in the beating of Rodney King (Sastry and Bates, 2017). It took the jury only one day to reach a 
verdict: Van Dyke was found guilty of second-degree murder and 16 counts of aggravated battery 
with a firearm—one count for each of the shots that hit McDonald. This was the first time in fifty 
years a Chicago police officer was convicted in the shooting of a citizen (Smith, Williams, and 
Davey, 2018). Yet, Van Dyke was acquitted of the charge of “official misconduct”—defined as 
“knowingly perform[ing] an act he knows he is forbidden by law to perform” (720 ILCS 5 § 33.3). 
 
 Police misconduct has a direct negative impact on citizens resulting in the tragic loss of 
life, massive racial disparities in criminal justice-related outcomes, and negative health 
consequences for neighborhoods and populations experiencing first- or even second-hand police 
abuses (Bor, Venkataramani, Williams, and Tsai, 2018; Sewell and Jefferson, 2016; Tyler and 
Wakslak, 2004). Police misconduct, abuse, and violence also rattles the very foundation of trust 
between residents and police (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). The police-citizen relationship is one of 
the most distinctive features of police officers’ jobs as their daily duties mandate interaction and 
cooperation with the public, often in unpredictable settings. When residents become cynical of the 
police, they tend to withdraw from contacting the police (Desmond, Papachristos, and Kirk, 2016) 
and, instead, may either seek out informal ways to police themselves or else leave some public 
safety matters unattended (Pattillo, 1998; Venkatesh, 2006). Police simply cannot do their jobs 
effectively without a working relationship with the community. Cynicism and mistrust of the 
police can stymie or hinder public safety efforts and, instead, keep crime rates higher in the very 
communities where fair and just policing practices are most needed (Baumer, 2002; Bobo and 
Thompson, 2006; Kirk and Papachristos, 2011). For example, a recent study in Milwaukee 
demonstrated that highly publicized instances of police abuse causes residents to shy away from 
calling 911—even for serious crimes such as robbery or assaults (Desmond et al., 2016). 
Understanding and doing something about police misconduct and abuse, then, becomes a 
significant policy issue not simply for repairing trust in the police but also for ensuring fair and 




Explanations of police misconduct and abuse often begin by focusing on personality traits 
or characteristics of individual officers, including race, ethnicity, sex, education, temperament, and 
even psychological disposition (e.g., Brandl, Stroshine, and Frank, 2001; Chappell and Piquero, 
2004). Such an individual approach often seeks out “problem officers” within a police 
department—the proverbial “rotten apples” approach. From such a rotten apples approach, Jason 
Van Dyke, not the more than seven other officers at the scene of the shooting or the Chicago Police 
Department more generally, are the source of the abuse and misconduct. And, indeed, prior to the 
murder of McDonald, Van Dyke had more than 20 documented complaints filed against him, many 
them for excessive “use of force;” one complaint against Van Dyke resulted in a $350,000 city 
payout to the complainant (McLaughlin, 2015; Wald, 2018). Other explanations prioritize 
organizational characteristics such as a unique police worldview, hypermasculinity, and the “noble 
cause” as the main drivers of police misconduct and abuses (e.g., Crank and Caldero, 2000; 
Delattre 2002; Hebert 1998; Kappeler, Sludder, and Alpert 1998; Klockars 1980). In contrast to 
the “rotten apples” approach, this “rotten barrel” perspective underscores the pervasive nature of 
police corruption, mismanagement, and biases that might suggest larger scale police reform. In the 
Chicago context, the legacy of systematic—and often consciously organized—police abuse spans 
decades and contributes to a highly racialized criminal justice system (Taylor, 2013; Department 
of Justice, 2017). The fact that the other officers at the Van Dyke shooting did nothing—while 
others are accused and awaiting trial for tampering with evidence—is indicative of larger 
systematic problems. A report on police accountability in Chicago issued by the Police 
Accountability Task Force (2016:7,13) summarizes the larger organizational and cultural situation 
in Chicago: “CPD’s own data gives validity to the widely held belief the police have no regard for 
the sanctity of life when it comes to people of color. . . The community’s lack of trust in CPD is 
justified.” 
 
While empirical studies have led to important findings on both the individual and 
organizational factors associated with police misconduct, results are inconclusive and, at times, 
inconsistent. Studies on the “rotten apple” perspective have shown that individual-level correlates 
associated with misconduct in one context, may not be found in another. Likewise, studies of 
organizational characteristics have shown that organizational effects associated with police 
misconduct are not necessarily the same across departments nor are the various forms (and 
seriousness levels) of misconduct (e.g., corruption vs. mismanagement). Yet, if we consider police 
misconduct as a form of deviance—a type of behavior that diverges from the expressed mission 
of police institutions—then, like other forms of deviance, it is likely a behavior learned through 
social relationships. The importance of social networks in the learning of deviant behavior is at the 
center of many core criminological theories (e.g., Akers, 1998; Sutherland, 1947) and applied to 
the context of police misconduct is consistent with a long line of research that underscores how 
police subculture shapes police behavior. Still, little is known about these transmission processes 
within the police context, and whether problem behavior can be learned, and passed on through 
exposure to more deviant colleagues (Roithmayr, 2016). A focus on these processes allows us to 
move beyond debates about “rotten apples” and “rotten barrels,” and hone in on the mechanisms 
that facilitate misconduct.  
 
The current study examines the role of deviant colleagues in facilitating exposure to, and 
the propensity to accrue, use of force complaints. Using an extensive dataset on citizen and 
department complaints filed against Chicago police officers, we investigate the prevalence of 
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repeated misconduct complaints, and particularly, the degree to which use of force complaints are 
concentrated around a small group of individuals (i.e., problem officers). Specifically, we use a 
series of frailty models for recurrent event data to test the effect of having higher proportions of 
peers with use of force complaints in one’s social network on subsequent use of force complaints. 
Consistent with research on deviance in other settings, we hypothesize that social networks and 
exposure to the behavior of other officers in one’s network plays an important role in the social 
transmission of police misconduct.  
 
Though Chicago is a relatively unique setting given its unique history and size, it provides 
an ideal research setting for studying exposure to deviance. The Chicago Police Department 
represents one of the largest law enforcement agencies within the United States. It is also the site 
of one of the largest inquiries into the prevalence and persistence of misconduct within a 
department (e.g., Department of Justice, 2017), and thus provides an ideal research setting for 
providing vital insights into a problem that persists across the country. Understanding exposure to 
misconduct in social networks is likely to yield practical insights that can be used to curtail the 
spread of these behaviors in various organizational settings.  Such findings might also be applied 
to other forms of deviant (occupational or non-occupational) networks. Our results indicate that 
being tied to officers with a history of use of force complaints elevates the risk of being involved 
in subsequent use of force complaints, suggesting that there may be some support for the social 
transmission of severe police misconduct (e.g., Roithmayr, 2016). 
 
Background: Apples, Barrels, and Networks 
 
Research on police misconduct can be (broadly) classified into one of two groups: studies 
that emphasize officer attributes as correlates of misconduct (i.e., “rotten apples”) and studies that 
emphasize departmental or even institutional attributes as key to understanding misconduct (i.e., 
“rotten barrels”). Studies from both perspectives have led to the identification of a host of risk 
factors as important correlates of misconduct ranging from a general focus on individual-level 
correlates of an officer (e.g., sex, race, age, rank; Bloch and Anderson, 1974; Wolfe and Piquero, 
2011) to organizational and occupational forces set forth by police administrators (e.g., Hickman, 
Piquero, and Piquero, 2004; Kappeler et al., 1998; Weisburd et al., 2000; Wolfe and Piquero, 
2011), to the police culture and socialized behaviors (e.g., Chappell and Piquero, 2004; Herbert, 
1998; Ingram, Terrill, and Paoline, 2018).   
 
Studies examining individual-level predictors of officer misconduct, or traits that are 
conducive to a preferred policing style or orientation, have produced some mixed findings. For 
instance, on the one hand, research has found that minority officers received significantly fewer 
misconduct complaints when compared to their White colleagues (Wolfe and Piquero, 2011), or, 
alternatively, that race/ethnicity did not play a role in the receipt of filed complaints (Brandl et al., 
2001). On the other hand, studies by Cohen and Chaiken (1972) and Kane and White (2009) have 
found that Black and Latino officers were more likely than White officers to engage in misconduct. 
Several studies also find the association with race and ethnicity might very well be confounded by 
the differential assignment of minority officers to high-crime neighborhoods, exposing them to 
greater opportunities for misconduct and use of force (Fyfe, 1988; Terrill and Mastrofski 2002; 




Conversely, when compared to their male counterparts, female officers tend to be less 
aggressive in their role. Prior research has suggested that female officers are less likely to be 
involved in use of force complaints (Waugh, Ede, and Alley, 1998), or use physical force (Bazley, 
Lersch, and Mieczkowski, 2007; Rabe-Hemp and Schuck, 2005) and weapons (Hoffman and 
Hickey, 2005) in police-citizen encounters. Female officers initiate fewer citizen encounters, make 
fewer arrests (Bloch and Anderson, 1974; Morash and Greene, 1986), are subject to fewer citizen 
complaints (Brandl et al., 2001; Chappell and Piquero, 2004; Greene et al., 2004) and are less 
likely to be the subjects of excessive force complaints (Adams, 1999; Brandl et al., 2001). The 
mechanism behind why female officers are less likely to use physical force or are involved in use 
of force complaints is unclear. Scholars have suggested that female officers may rely on inherently 
different experiences, talents, and skills compared to males (Horne, 1980; Rabe-Hemp and Schuck, 
2005). Yet, in a study of 1,545 officers dismissed or forced to leave the New York Police 
Department for reasons of misconduct, Fyfe and Kane (2006) found that officer sex was a non-
significant attribute in predicting misconduct.  
 
Officer tenure and rank have also been found to impact officer attitudes and behaviors that 
lead to misconduct. High-complaint officers are significantly more likely to be younger, less 
experienced, and more likely to receive departmental disciplinary action (Brandl et al., 2001; 
Donner and Jennings, 2014; Greene et al., 2004). This has been attributed to younger officers’ 
heightened activity; “younger officers initiate more contact with the public, conduct a higher 
proportion of preventative patrolling, and record more crime reports” leading to a higher 
probability of receiving complaints (Adams, 1999; Brandl et al., 2001: 523). Further, higher-
ranking officers have also been found to have lower rates of criminal or serious misconduct 
offenses (Kane and White, 2009).  
 
Organizationally-oriented studies conceive of misconduct and deviance as the product of a 
“police worldview” or subculture generated by organizational practices and the unique nature of 
policing as a profession (e.g., Kappeler et al., 1998; Wilson, 1968). Broadly speaking, such a 
perspective maintains that police misconduct is learned through this unique policing subculture, 
which prescribes a set of common beliefs, values, and norms among officers (Crank, 1998; 
Herbert, 1998; Ingram et al., 2018; Kappeler et al., 1998; Wilson, 1968). Police work engenders a 
set of demands and expectations that emphasize loyalty and encourages a sense of brotherhood 
designed to overcome resistance while creating an environment that protects the interests of 
officers who violate the law (e.g., code of silence; Skolnick, 1966; Wilson, 1968). Such a 
worldview is further driven by the real and perceived dangers of policing and facilitates a polarized 
“us” versus “them” mentality across the daily practices of officers (Alpert and Dunham, 1997; 
Barker, 1977; Herbert, 1998). These many aspects of police work may produce a hyper-masculine 
culture that encourages socialized behaviors that are compatible with other members in the 
organization (Harris, 2000; Messerschmidt, 1993; Schuck, 2014). This police subculture breeds an 
in-group mentality whereby officers learn, and exchange, cultural knowledge and a set of 
constructs that are favorable to their group identity (Chappell and Piquero, 2004: 93). Thus, in 
parallel with the behaviors and attitudes that are formed and shaped by the subculture, criminal 
and deviant behavior is likely to be transmitted through these occupational groups and in 
association with other like-minded individuals (Reiss and Farrington, 1991; Warr and Stafford, 




To interrogate the importance of police subculture in such a socialization process, Savitz 
(1970) examined how recruits from the Philadelphia Police Department advanced from the police 
academy to the streets. During their first three years on the job, Savitz (1970) found that new 
officers were socialized into their occupational role and that greater exposure to the police 
subculture facilitated more permissive towards deviant police behavior. Newer officers frequently 
adopted the “cynical” beliefs of older more experienced officers. Police officers themselves have 
also been found to direct such cynicism against their own police organizations and consider their 
own deviant behavior or misconduct as an adaptation for the sake of “noble cause of public safety 
and justice” (Wolfe and Piquero 2011: 335). In other words, officers can see departmental policies 
as a hindrance to “good police work.” For example, in a sample of 483 Philadelphia police officers, 
Wolfe and Piquero (2011) found that officers who perceived their agency as engaging in fair 
management practices (e.g., engaged in distributive outcomes through pay and promotions) held 
fewer beliefs that were favorable to noble-cause corruption. These officers also showed lower 
levels of adherence to the code of silence within their department. Conversely, officers who were 
associated with a greater percentage of deviant peers that favored minor forms of police 
misconduct showed greater adherence to the code of silence, and stronger beliefs that supported 
corruption for a noble cause.  
 
Both individual and organizational perspectives of police misconduct bring forward 
compelling but incomplete explanations of police misconduct. Without a doubt, organizational and 
cultural dimensions of police work influence patterns of misconduct. For example, officers have 
virtually no say in their assignments or partners, let alone the political priorities of a police chief 
or mayor. And, still, individual officers vary in their responses to police culture with some 
engaging in misconduct while others do not.  For all their differences, the ‘rotten apples’ and 
‘rotten barrels’ perspectives are similar in their weaknesses: they both acknowledge the fact that 
behaviors are learned, modified, and adopted through the formal and informal interactions of 
individuals within organizations but fail to empirically test these notions in the same way as 
criminologists have approached other deviant behaviors. Students of deviant behavior have 
persistently noted the importance of considering the social contexts from which deviance 
emerges—and the very same logic might apply to understanding the importance of networks in 
the learning of police deviance.  
 
The Importance of Networks 
 
 The focus of this study, a police officer’s social network, captures a conceptual middle 
ground in this “individuals versus organizations” debate. Elements of police culture clearly 
facilitate and potentially even perpetuate police misconduct, but police agencies do not teach 
misconduct so transparently. Police do not, for example, learn how to make false arrests in the 
academy. Rather, individual officers learn different forms of misconduct through interactions 
(formal and informal) with their fellow officers—a proposition consistent with social learning 
theories more generally (e.g., Akers 1998), empirical studies of networks and deviance in 
organizations more specifically (e.g., Baker and Faulkner, 1993; 2003), as well as insights gleaned 
from police ethnographies on the informal socialization “on the job” (Manning, 1977; Moskos, 
2008; Reiss, 1973; Westley, 1970). Chappell and Piquero (2004) underline this point in a study of 
how police officers’ perceptions of peer behavior affected misconduct complaints. In their study 
of Philadelphia police officers, Chappell and Piquero (2004) found that officers who perceived 
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their peers as likely to rationalize deviant behaviors (e.g., excessive use of force) were more likely 
to have misconduct complaints filed against them.  
 
Despite understanding that police subculture may facilitate deviant behavior, no studies 
have applied formal network methods to examine if social networks impact police misconduct.1 
Our assertion that police deviance is socially transmitted through peer networks embodies a core 
theme of criminological research on crime and delinquency (Brandl et al., 2001; Harris, 2010; 
Roithmayr, 2016). Through various mechanisms, it is a firmly established fact that much of crime 
is committed in the company of others (Reiss and Farrington, 1991; Warr and Stafford, 1991; 
Weerman, 2003). The role of social connections and processes in shaping offending patterns has 
a long theoretical history (Akers, 1998; Matsueda, 1982; Sutherland, 1947; Warr, 2002), and has 
been supported by numerous empirical studies (Conway and McCord, 2002; Haynie, 2001; 2002; 
McGloin, Sullivan, and Thomas, 2014). A growing area of research has begun to apply formal 
network models and methods as a way to directly measure the link between an individual’s social 
connections and the social influence processes that condition deviant outcomes (for reviews, see 
Gravel and Tita, 2017; Haynie and Kreager, forthcoming; Papachristos 2011).  
 
In a recent theoretical essay, Roithmayr (2016) explicitly draws on a similar networked-
logic to argue that police use of excessive force may spread between officers through a contagion-
like process. Roithmayr (2016) suggests that excessive use of force may spread through a process 
of social contagion, much like violent victimization has been shown to diffuse in networks of gang 
members and their associates (Green, Horel, and Papachristos, 2017; Papachristos, Braga, Hureau, 
2012; Papachristos, Braga, Piza, and Grossman, 2015). Roithmayr (2016: 427) focuses on 
“program-level sequence learning” which entails learning by observation in social settings of the 
organization of behaviors that can be applied to future situations. Police officers may learn to 
employ excessive use of force once they have learned—by observing other officers engaged in the 
behavior—how to identify situations where it can be applied to achieve a goal, such as subduing a 
citizen resisting arrest. Learning of such behavior through observations is particularly likely to 
occur if “a police officer observes another officer using excessive force and obtaining a positive 
reward—say, approval by the officer’s colleagues or the reward of reducing risk by shortening the 
duration of an encounter with a resistant civilian” (Roithmayr, 2016: 429). This perspective is 
consistent with research more broadly by Sierra-Arévalo (2016) who emphasizes that certain 
behaviors that are adopted in the name of the “danger imperative,” though not necessarily in line 
with departmental policy, are often learned through informal means of socialization. 
 
The adoption of deviant behavior by police officers and the social mechanisms that drive 
their adoption suggests that informal networks may play an important role in the diffusion of 
behaviors in a police department. Establishing social contagion as a mechanism for driving the 
adoption of behaviors is a complicated process that requires a study of the structural features of 
relevant networks (Burt, 1987; Valente, 1996). The current study seeks to establish whether the 
necessary condition for social contagion—the link between exposure and subsequent behavior 
adoption—can be established in the context of police misconduct. Our objective is to assess 
whether exposure to officers with a history of excessive use of force increases one’s own likelihood 
of engaging in similar behavior. We measure social networks through co-involvement of officers 
 
1 However, important studies have examined the role of officer social networks in facilitating racial integration 
within police academies (e.g. Conti and Doreian, 2010; Doreian and Conti, 2012). 
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in misconduct complaints where officers are linked by virtue of being named in the same 
complaint. Our main hypothesis is that officers are at a heightened risk of use of force complaints 
if their ego-network has a high concentration of colleagues with a history of such behaviors 
(measured as the proportion of prior co-accused with prior use of force complaints). The overall 
objective is to look at how variation in the exposure to excessive use of force behaviors in 
misconduct networks can affect an officer’s propensity for the same behavior.  
 
Data and Methods 
 
This study relies on complaint records filed with the Chicago Police Department (CPD) 
from 2007 to 2015 to determine involvement in use of force situations. These data were retrieved 
by the Invisible Institute, a nonprofit organization, who obtained the records through a series of 
FOIA and litigation requests.2 Each record was coded according to a series of indicators and has 
since been made publicly available on the Invisible Institute’s website and Github page.3,4 The 
complaint records include detailed information on all the officers named in the complaint (e.g., 
sex, race/ethnicity, date of birth, tenure, rank and unit within the CPD), as well as details of the 
complaint itself, including the date and a description of the incident. The complaint records cover 
the period 2000 to mid-2016; however, we focus on complaints made from January 1, 2007 to 
December 31, 2015, the years for which information was most complete at the time of this writing. 
These data comprise 11,686 officers who were involved in at least one of 30,450 complaints. 
Important for the current study, 76 percent of officers (n = 8,914) were involved in multiple 
complaints, allowing us to examine how exposure to deviant peers influences misconduct patterns 
over time.  
 
These data are well suited for the analysis of misconduct networks on excessive use of 
force. Use of force complaints represent more visible forms of misconduct, albeit not without its 
caveats (discussed in the limitations section) and have been found to be relatively reliable measures 
of misconduct (McCluskey and Terrill, 2005: 513). Our interest in the use of force, allows us to 
exploit variation in the types of misconduct across officers and specifically involvement in 
repeated misconduct complaints. Our focus on the social transmission of deviant behavior required 
that we retain officers who had at least two separate incidents over the observation period to 
examine how behavior in one period influenced behavior in the next. This creates a final sample 
of 8,624 officers named in more than one complaint over the observation period (2007-2015). It 
excludes officers who had missing information on key covariates, were only named in complaints 
with more than 15 co-accused, and complaints for which there were no details on the nature of the 
incident. Because officers were involved in multiple complaints (M = 6.19 complaints per officer; 
standard deviation (SD) = 5.17), this resulted in a study sample of 43,718 officer-complaint 
observations. 
 
Use of Force 
 
Use of force represents an important social issue. Implications incurred from use of proper 
or improper force are high, undermining police legitimacy (Westley, 1970), increasing legal 
 
2 For detailed information on these data see Ba (2016), and Rozema and Schanzenbach (2018). 
3 Available at https://github.com/invinst/chicago-police-data (Accessed September 8, 2018). 
4 Available at https://invisible.institute/police-data (Accessed September 8, 2018). 
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cynicism, and diminishing cooperative behaviors, on the part of citizens, that are needed to help 
police effectively carry out their daily duties (Bayley, 2002; Decker, 1981; Desmond, 
Papachristos, and Kirk, 2016; Reiss, 1968; Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993). For each officer-complaint 
observation, we generated a dichotomous measure of whether the officer was involved in a use of 
force complaint (1 = use of force, 0 = non-use of force). Complaints were classified as use of force 
complaints if the complaint entailed: excessive force (use of a firearm, use of conductive energy 
device), unnecessary physical contact, and acts that resulted in injury/death. The most frequent 
categories were excessive force that resulted in an injury (59%), excessive force that did not result 
in an injury (19%), followed by unnecessary physical contact (12%) and use of a firearm (8%). Of 
the unique officers in our sample, 52 percent (n = 4,523) received at least one use of force 




A key feature of complaint records is that they provide details on all officers accused of 
the incident. This allows us to examine each officer’s misconduct network (i.e., all other officers 
accused of misconduct with the officer) across their history of complaints and detect whether 
changes in these networks are associated with subsequent misconduct patterns. An officer’s 
misconduct network includes all co-accused officers who were named in the same complaint with 
the focal officer, creating a network in which officers are linked to each other through complaints. 
These misconduct networks represent a particular type of social network more accurately 
described as behavioral networks similar to co-offending networks (e.g., Papachristos, Wildeman, 
and Roberto, 2015), needle-sharing networks (Koester, Glanz, and Barón, 2005), and sexual 
networks (Bearman, Moody, and Stovel, 2004). Presence in the network requires at least some 
involvement in the behavior and captures only relationships between individuals that are recorded 
(in our case, involvement in police misconduct). A network based on citizen complaints represents 
only a fraction of the social ties between officers, so we are likely underestimating the true network 
and emphasizing only relationships with a potentially negative influence. We discuss the 
implications of this limitation in the discussion section.   
 
Of the officers in our sample, 95 percent (n = 8,194) were named in at least one complaint 
with two or more officers. On average, complaints had 1.89 officers (SD = 1.58), with 56 percent 
involving more than one officer. Because some complaints may only involve a single officer, we 
include a measure of the number of individuals named on the complaint and a measure of the 
number of times an officer was named in a prior solo complaint as covariates in our models. 
 
We measure exposure to peers with a history of excessive use of force as the proportion of 
co-complainants who have previously been accused of a use of force complaint. Thus, an officer’s 
exposure at time t is thought to influence their behavior at time t + 1.5 It differs from the other 
network measures in that it is calculated before the complaint, measuring an officer’s exposure to 
co-complainants with prior histories of use of force. We first identify the number of unique 
individuals that an officer had been named in a complaint with prior to the current event. Then, for 
each unique co-complainant, we identify whether they had been named in any use of force 
complaint prior to the current event. Lastly, this information is used to calculate the proportion of 
 
5 Also see Fujimoto and Valente (2012) and Papachristos, Wildeman, and Roberto (2015) for additional applications 
of network exposure models. 
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officers in their network who have been named in a use of force complaint.6 Thus, the likelihood 
of an officer being named in a use of force complaint at time t is a function of their network 
exposure (i.e., the proportion of officers in their complaint network with a prior use of force 
complaints) at time t – x. A positive and statistically significant effect would suggest a social 
influence mechanism whereby an officer’s likelihood of becoming involved in a use of force 
complaint increases as the proportion of contacts with a history of use of force in his or her personal 
misconduct network increases.  
 
Figure 1 provides a visual demonstration of how we measure an officer’s exposure to use 
of force. The figure represents a hypothetical officer’s (“ego”) exposure to use of force from their 
first complaint (Complaint 1) until their last complaint (Complaint 3). The ego represents the focal 
officer, and the officer’s ego network by nodes A through E. White nodes represent officers who 
have not been named in any use of force complaints, and black nodes represent officers who have 
been named in a use of force complaint(s). Because officers’ network exposure is calculated from 
previous complaints, an officer’s network exposure is only available after their first complaint. In 
Complaint 2 the ego’s network exposure is 0 percent, as none of the officers’s in their ego network 
were named in a use of force complaint at t – x (i.e., Complaint 1). In Complaint 3, the ego’s 
network exposure increases to 50 percent, based off changes to their exposure in Complaint 2. In 
Complaint 2 the ego’s misconduct network consisted of four other officers (i.e., Officers A, B, C, 
and D). Of these, two officers had been named in a prior use of force complaint (i.e., Officer’s C 
and D). Thus, for each complaint, an officer’s misconduct network has the potential to remain 
stable (i.e., re-offend with the same officers) or grow (offend with new officers). The degree to 
which they are exposed to use of force depends on whether officers in their ego network have 
engaged in this behavior. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
To avoid confounding network exposure with an individual’s prior behavior, we also 
include a lagged measure of the cumulative number of use of force complaints an officer has been 
named in at the time of the complaint.7 Because officers observed earlier on in the study are less 
likely to have been exposed to peers with a history of use of force, as compared to officers observed 




We also look at how other dimensions of police ego networks may structure officer 
misconduct patterns, including the impact of being named in complaints with more experienced 
officers. We measure the experience-level within an officer’s misconduct network by creating a 
continuous measure of the mean years of service with the CPD for all the co-complainants at the 
time of the incident. While some studies have suggested officers with greater experience may have 
more to lose from being named in a complaint and may also have acquired the necessary 
 
6 We also estimated network exposure in our models as two direct effects: 1) the number of unique co-accused in an 
officer’s network previously accused of use of force; and 2) the number of unique co-accused in an officer’s 
network. The results were substantively similar to those reported in the paper. 
7 As a sensitivity analysis, we also ran all models without this lagged variable. All substantive results remained the 
same to those reported in the paper. 
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experience to diffuse situations from escalating to force (e.g. Brandl et al., 2001), others have 
suggested length of service is associated with increased cynicism and misconduct (Chappell and 
Piquero, 2004; Donner and Jennings, 2014). Here, we examine how being named in a complaint 
with more tenured officers influences the likelihood of being involved in use of force complaints. 
In this way, we aim to capture a mentorship relationship that has traditionally been viewed as the 
tendency for recruits to be paired with veteran officers once they graduate from the academy (Asch, 
1968; Edmundson, 1999; Muir, 1977). More experienced “veteran” officers can serve as mentors 
to newer officers, enhancing their familiarity with the community and administrative areas, and 
thus guiding recruits on the culture, and practices of law enforcement (Edmundson, 1999; Muir, 
1977). Alternatively, in other contexts, mentors may (formally or informally) socialize recruits to 
conduct the same types of unethical behaviors (Manning, 1977; Skolnick, 1966). 
 
Heterogeneity of Co-accused 
 
We also examine how the sex and racial/ethnic composition of the misconduct network 
influences the likelihood of being involved in use of force complaints. We measure sex as the 
proportion of co-complainants who were female at the time of the complaint. We measure 
race/ethnicity as the proportion of co-complainants who shared the same race as the officer at the 
time of the complaint. Previous studies have highlighted that cross-race interactions are unequally 
distributed across police networks (Haarr, 2005). Here we examine whether the distribution of 




Our models also include additional individual-level controls for sex, race/ethnicity, and 
length of service. An officer’s sex (female, male) and race (White, Black, Hispanic, and other) are 
all dummy coded and included as static variables. We also include an officer’s tenure, measured 
as the number of years from the officer’s appointment date to the complaint date, along with 
tenure-squared to control for a potential non-linear effect of tenure as continuous dynamic 
variables in all models.  
 
Further, complaints are not likely to be randomly distributed across officers but related to 
their degree of exposure to citizens and high crime neighborhoods. We control for this with two 
dummy indicators of an officer’s exposure based on their rank (0 = rank above a police officer8; 1 
= police officer) and unit (0 = non-specialized unit, 1 = specialized unit9) within the police 
department. We assume that officers with higher ranks within the CPD are less likely to be exposed 
to the public and more likely to face higher costs associated with complaints. In contrast, officers 
who belong to specialized units, such as strike force units, gang units, narcotics units and special 
weapons and tactics, are more likely to be exposed to opportunities for complaints. Officers within 
these units do not respond to service calls, rather they are tasked with seeking out problematic 
 
8 Rank above police officer: Sergeant (12%), Detective (6%), Field Training Officer (2%), Lieutenant (2%), Captain 
(0.53%), ET (0.53%), Commander (0.35%), Agent (0.02%), and Chief (0.07%).  
9 Specialized units include gang-related units (53%), narcotics units (41%), special weapons and tactics (SWAT) 
(4%), and mobile strike force units (2%). We also estimated models using dummy variables for each specialized unit 
rather than classifying them into a single group; however, none of these variables were significantly associated with 
use of force complaints. 
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activity. Previous investigations of the Chicago Police Department have suggested that these units, 
which has involved “jump out squads” tasked with seeking arrests, often creates situations 
conducive to increased involvement in use of force, (i.e., suspects fleeing) (Department of Justice, 
2017: 31). Further, officers who belong to these units may be self-selective, with younger, highly 
active officers more likely to select into these units (see Moskos, 2008: 137).  
 
Lastly, we control for the year the complaint was made to the department. During the period 
we analyzed, a complaint could be initiated remotely, yet for a complaint to be investigated, the 
complainant was required to sign an affidavit in-person at an oversight agency in the city. On 
December 19, 2011, the location of the oversight agency where complainants could sign an 
affidavit moved from the South Side to the Near West Side of Chicago.  The new location was not 
only less accessible by transit, but also represented a shift from a neighborhood with a high 
proportion of Black residents to a neighborhood with a high proportion of White and Hispanic 
residents, thus differentially influencing the convenience of filing complaints (Ba, 2016). These 
administrative and location changes not only impacted how misconducts were filed, but also 
impacted the rates at which complaints were sustained through a civilian’s willingness, and 
decision to file a complaint and/or to subsequently to complete their complaint against the police 
(for a discussion on this see Ba, 2016). Our measure for the year the complaint occurred aims to, 




Our analysis proceeds through two main steps. First, we provide a descriptive summary of 
the distribution of use of force complaints in our sample, which allows us to assess the prevalence 
of use of force and the degree to which these complaints are concentrated around a small group of 
individuals. Second, we estimate frailty models for recurrent event data to assess the association 
between exposure to use of force and an officer’s likelihood of engaging in use of force complaints. 
This approach allows us to assess our main variable of interest, whether an officer’s misconduct 
network influences their subsequent involvement in use of force. 
 
A key element of our research design is that officers can experience the event – 
involvement in a use of force complaint – more than once. Recurrent event data are a special type 
of event history data that allows for multiple events and records the timing of transitions between 
events (Therneau and Grambsch, 2000). To model dependence between events, we extend the 
hazard models to include a frailty component. The frailty component is analogous to a random 
effect, accounting for unobserved variability within individuals over time (Therneau and 
Grambsch, 2000). 
 
Officers are identified as entering the risk set after their first recorded complaint and remain 
at risk of use of force complaints even after having been involved in a use of force complaint. The 
risk intervals between events capture the number of days between complaints (Andersen and Gill 
1982). This approach effectively models the risk of being named in a use of force complaint since 
the last complaint. Thus, rather than re-setting an officer’s time at risk to zero after experiencing 
an event, it preserves the number of days and picks up from the last date, allowing officers to enter 
the risk set at different time points for different durations. Because some officers were named in 
more than one complaint on the same day, we only counted this as a single event, taking the values 
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for the most serious complaint and maximum value across the covariates. In addition, because our 
models include both use of force and non-use of force complaints, officers may be censored after 
entering the risk set for a non-use of force complaint. This approach allows us to include 
information from all complaints and not just those where the officer ‘failed’ (i.e., use of force 
complaints).  
 
Another important component of estimating recurrent event models concerns the unknown 
starting times for a subset of officers. These officers may have already been accused of a complaint 
at time t when the period began, and thus we do not know the exact time when officers were first 
accused of a complaint. We address this in our regression models two ways. First, we treat all 
officers in the window period as if they had first experienced the event in time t and not t - x. 
Second, we include a continuous variable that indicates the number of years the officer has been 
with the force (i.e., tenure). Officers appointed prior to 2007, the beginning of our observation 
period, may have already experienced the event. Including the number of years an officer has been 
on the force should effectively control for the effect of extra exposure time. All models were 
estimated using the survival package (Therneau, 2015) in the R software for statistical computing 




Figure 2 shows the distribution of misconduct complaints over time. From 2007 to 2015 
our sample includes 29,634 recorded complaints made to the Chicago Police Department. Figure 
2 disaggregates these into use of force and non-use of force complaints. Complaints made to the 
CPD gradually decreased over the study period, from a high of 4,511 complaints in 2007 to a low 
of 1,904 complaints in 2015. Despite this drop, the proportion of use of force complaints stays 
relatively stable from 2007 to 2012, representing approximately 20 percent of all complaints each 
year. However, in 2013 this starts to drop with use of force complaints representing only seven 
percent of all complaints by 2015. This drop may be attributed to administrative changes, and 
civilian oversight on police performance (Ba, 2016).  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Figure 3 (left) shows the distribution of complaints across officers in the final sample (n = 
8,624) from 2007 to 2015. Because this only includes repeat officers, all officers received at least 
two complaints. Of these officers, approximately one half (48%) received five or more complaints. 
Figure 3 (right) shows the distribution of officers who received at least one use of force complaint 
(n = 4,523). Of these officers, approximately one half (52%) were named in a single use of force 
complaint. It was relatively rare for officers to be named in multiple use of force complaints, with 
only 359 officers, receiving five or more complaints. Officers with five or more use of force 
complaints represent 4 percent of our overall sample but contribute 29 percent of person-
complaints for use of force. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Table 2 presents the results from the frailty models. Model I serve as our baseline, 
examining officer characteristics associated with use of force complaints. Results show that officer 
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characteristics, including sex, tenure, and rank are all associated with recurrent use of force 
complaints. Male officers were more likely to be involved in multiple use of force complaints. In 
contrast, officers’ who had served with the CPD over a longer period were less likely to be named 
in use of force complaints. However, our square term for years of service is positive and 
significant, suggesting a curvilinear relationship. We interpret this as a reflection of how officers 
progress in their careers, with officers who have been with the department for longer periods less 
likely to be on routine patrol duties that may expose them to opportunities for complaints. Figure 
4 plots the hazard ratio at different values of tenure for an average male, White police officer (not 
in a specialized unit) along with the probability density function for the tenure variable. As seen 
in Figure 4, the hazard associated with tenure drops dramatically until about ten-years on the job 
and begins to level off in the subsequent decade, suggesting that use of force is much more likely 
in the early part of an officer’s career. Officer race and ethnicity are not significantly associated 
with use of force complaints. 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
Unsurprisingly given the trend shown in Figure 2, complaints made against officers in later 
years are negatively associated with use of force complaints. Another significant control variable 
is the number of prior solo complaints. Each additional past solo complaint increases the likelihood 
of future use of force complaints by seven percent in Model I, indicating that officers who are 
named in many complaints by themselves have a greater likelihood of engaging in more serious 
offenses. As is commonly found in research on offender versatility (e.g. Gottfredson and Hirschi, 
1990; Guerette, Stenius, and McGloin, 2005), this result may suggest that police officers who 
engage in any complaint are likely to escalate into use of force complaints. On the other hand, our 
results point to a decrease in the likelihood of future use of force complaints as officers accumulate 
past complaints for the same type of misconduct. As we mentioned above, repeat use of force 
misconduct, while not necessarily rare, is not particularly common in our sample, despite a few 
unusually persistent officers. While we do not have information regarding the outcome of these 
misconduct complaints (i.e., whether the complaint was sustained or not), this finding may point 
to the fact that repeated serious misconduct such as excessive use of force may be more likely to 
be met with discipline leading to the deterrence of problem officers. However, we are cautious in 
this assessment given past reports on the lack of, or relatively lax discipline that officers received 
for involvement in use of force complaints (Department of Justice, 2017: 36-37). The findings for 
all three of these control variables remain significant across all subsequent models.   
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Model II introduces the effects of officers’ misconduct networks. Results show that 
officers’ co-complainants exerted a positive effect on the probability of being involved in recurrent 
use of force complaints. Being paired with a higher proportion of female officers had a negative 
and statistically significant impact on an offender’s likelihood of receiving use of force complaints. 
Consistent with our individual-level results, the proportion of an officer’s network who share the 
same race/ethnicity as the officer had no statistically significant association with subsequent use 
of force complaints. Similarly, the mean years of service of officers’ co-complainants had no 




In support of our main hypothesis, exposure to colleagues with a history of use of force is 
positively and significantly associated with use of force complaints (HR = 1.66, 95% CI = [1.52-
1.81], p < .001). Compared to an officer in a network with no officers previously involved in use 
of force, an officer with an average proportion (39%) of officers with a history of use of force in 
their immediate network is 26 percent more likely to be involved in a future use of force complaint. 
Conversely, officers whose misconduct networks consist of fewer officers who were previously 
involved in use of force, are less likely to become involved in use of force complaints. Figure 5 
shows the hazard ratios at different values of exposure to use of force (left) and percent female 
officer for an average male, white police officer (not in a specialized unit) along with the 
probability density function for each variable. Being named in a use of force complaint increases 
as an officer’s exposure to colleagues with prior use of force complaints increases. In contrast, 
being named in a use of force complaint increases as an officer’s exposure to female colleagues 
decreases. 
 




Prior studies of police misconduct have primarily analyzed the individual- or departmental-
level correlates of deviance. These studies have led to important debates on whether patterns in 
misconduct can be traced to a few individual officers or whether misconduct is a product of larger 
departmental issues. This article presents one of the first studies to use formal network analyses to 
investigate how officer networks influence involvement in misconduct, examining how 
misconduct may be socially transmitted across deviant officers. In addition to confirming the 
importance of several individual-level attributes—such as sex, tenure, and history of use of force—
our results highlighted the importance of exposure to police misconduct in one’s network as a 
predictor of subsequent use of force behavior. Officers who were embedded in networks with a 
higher proportion of colleagues previously named in use of force complaints were more likely to 
be named in subsequent use of force complaints. These findings held even after controlling for 
officers’ characteristics and for the opportunity of being named in future use of force complaints.  
 
The finding that networks matter for understanding police misconduct echoes research on 
the role of peers in structuring patterns of delinquency and crime patterns more broadly. 
Specifically, the results are consistent with Conway and McCord’s (2002) finding that co-
offending with more serious offenders increases one’s own likelihood of being involved in more 
serious offenses. The authors contend that deviance is learned and passed on through impromptu 
social contexts where co-offenders converge. But, police officers in many ways are distinct from 
general offenders in several fundamental ways, the least of which is their sworn role as public 
servants charged with helping maintain public safety. Moreover, unlike the informal nature of peer 
groups, policing is not an impromptu social context. Police officers share relatively long-standing 
relationships that are highly controlled by police organizations themselves. Many officer 
relationships are directly tied to other structural features, including their graduating class, the unit 
they are assigned to, the partners with whom they are assigned, and the geographic areas where 
they patrol. Such contextual factors create conditions for more or less repetitive and stable 
interactions. In the context of social learning, being embedded in stable relationships may 
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condition processes associated with the transmission of deviant behavior.10 Officers may rely on 
what they have heard or observed when making challenging decisions – much of which may be 
learned through their colleagues. 
 
Our findings are also consistent with a long line of ethnographic and empirical research 
that has highlighted the role of social forces in structuring officer behavior, especially informal 
socialization. In his ethnography of the police subculture, Moskos (2008) argued that officer 
behavior is often structured by an informal police code of conduct than by formal regulations and 
policies. Describing the police subculture, Moskos (2008: 104-105) states: “the code also states 
that to enter and back down from a conflict is a loss of face. Nobody wants to be ‘punked’, least 
of all the police. Police play by these street rules with the assumption that any sign of weakness 
on their part will make future interactions much more difficult and dangerous. Police, quite simply, 
cannot afford to lose confrontations.” These social pressures to react or retaliate may be influenced 
by, and further exacerbated, by the officers’ exposure to deviant colleagues. Such an interpretation 
is also consistent with Roithmayr’s (2016) recent exposition on the possible learning dynamics 
involved in police use of force.  
 
This police subculture may also help attenuate officers’ perceptions of the risks associated 
with engaging in misconduct. Officers who are named in complaints may receive criminal 
sanctions, suspension, lack of promotion, and even termination of one’s career. With the risk of 
potentially career-ending behavior in the mix, how does an officer’s misconduct network change 
the equation with regards to adopting these risks? We argue that not only do police officers learn 
patterns of deviance through their colleagues, but that these networks alter the perception of 
informal and formal risks associated with misconduct, thereby neutralizing behaviors that 
otherwise would be considered deviant, or against academy-learned theory and training. The 
likelihood of being sanctioned, either from formal bodies or informally through your peers, may 
be reduced (or perceived to be reduced) in situations where officers are surrounded by a higher 
proportion of officers who have previously engaged in deviant behavior. Rather than be shunned 
for inappropriate behavior, engaging in similar behaviors may increase solidarity and loyalty 
between officers. For example, officers, or pairs of officers, that accept money or rewards (e.g., 
brides) to ignore some type of violation, officers that drink on the job together, or increasingly 
aggressive officers that get promoted with their behaviors misconstrued as greater engagement on 
the job, signs of leadership, courageous, and a “tough” on crime stance (Barker, 1977; Savitz, 
1970). Fellow officers may be tolerant, and less likely to hold others accountable for their actions 
if, they, themselves have previously engaged in serious misconduct (Savitz, 1970; Chappell and 




10 Such a proposition is consistent with the core idea of social learning and differentiational association theory in 
that the frequency, duration, intensity and priority of a tie relates to the probability of transmission. Relatedly, a 
foundational element of learning theory is instrumental conditioning and imitation, in that, one’s attitudes and 
behaviors are interconnected; thus, delinquency is learned, and thereby repeated, with persons that predominantly 
comprise or control one’s network, and in return, provide a source of reinforcement (see Sutherland, 1947; Akers 






First, the number of complaints likely underestimates the full scope of deviance within a 
police department. The discrepancy between complaint records and the ‘true’ prevalence of 
misconduct, largely stems from the fact that the latter only requires that a misconduct event takes 
place, whereas the former is related to the likelihood the event is reported. This additional burden 
of reporting introduces the potential for both false positives (cases where a victim misreports an 
incident) and false negatives (cases where misconduct occurs but is not reported). This is important 
given that the probability a citizen will report a complaint may vary across neighborhoods and 
populations. Ideally, we would have characteristics of the complainants which would allow us to 
control for this11, as well as information on the outcome of the complaint (sustained or not).12 
However, the lack of information on outcomes, coupled with the heavy critiques levied against the 
CPD for the lack of integrity in the systematic application of their discipline system and 
investigation of complaints (see Department of Justice, 2017), precluded us from controlling for 
the outcomes from complaints. That said, a recent study using similar complaint data in Chicago 
showed a strong relationship between citizen complaints and future civil rights litigations (Rozema 
and Schanzenbach, 2018), suggesting that misconduct complaints may be good proxies for officer 
behavior, particularly among repeat offenders. 
 
An additional limitation is that we do not have information on officers’ beat or other 
geographic assignments. Previous studies have emphasized that differential assignment of officers 
to higher crime neighborhoods may explain variation in complaints (e.g., Terrill and Reisig, 2003). 
As a sensitivity analysis we attempt to control for this by including information on the level of 
crime and concentrated disadvantage for the area where the complaint occurred. Information on 
crime levels was obtained from the Chicago Police Crime Summary, which reports the number of 
Index crimes detected for each police beat within the past year.13  Our measure of concentrated 
disadvantage was modelled from Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997), relying on census track 
data to conduct principle component analysis on percent unemployed, below the poverty line, 
receiving food stamps, single female household, black, and 18 years old or younger (Appendix, 
Table C).14 While complaint records provided information on the police beat where the incident 
occurred, concentrated disadvantage was measured at the census-tract level. We obtained district-
level measures of concentrated disadvantage by merging census tracts that overlapped 50 percent 
or more with the associated district.15 Further, because some complaint records lacked information 
 
11 Complaint records did provide information on complainant race, but only for a fraction of the incidents. Focusing 
only on use of force complaint, information on victim race was only available for 47 percent of all officer-complaint 
observations. A descriptive analysis of these complaints showed that 77 percent were made by black citizens; 
however, the lack of information precluded us from including it in our models. 
12 Information on the complaint outcome was provided for less than half of all complaints. Of the 43,718 police-
complaint observations, only five percent were reported as sustained, likely capturing a process issue rather than a 
reflection of guilt. 
13  Available at 
Http://gis.chicagopolice.org/website/clearMap_crime_sums/viewer.htm?SUMTYPE=BEAT&SUMCATA=INDEX
_&SUMTIME=365 accessed on August 2, 2017. 
14 All variables load above 0.4 except for percent residents aged 18 years or younger (0.35). We selected a one-
factor solution which resulted in an eigenvalue of 5.05. 
15 It should also be noted that officer-complaint records are nested within police beats, which are nested within 
police districts. We attempted to control for this by nesting officer-complaints within beats, and districts in our 
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on the location of the incident, our final sample only included 40,773 police-complaint 
observations.16 Results regarding the effect of network exposure remain robust to the inclusion of 
these controls. Exposure to a greater proportion of colleagues with a history of use of force was 
positively and significantly associated with use of force complaints (see Appendix, Table A). In 
addition, concentrated disadvantage was also positively associated with use of force complaints, 
showing officers who received complaints in areas with greater concentrated disadvantage were 
more likely to have use of force complaints lodged against them.17 
 
Further, our study only captures an officer’s misconduct network and not the broader social 
structure (and partnerships) in which an officer is embedded. Ideally, we would have access to 
non-deviant officers (those who were not named in any misconduct complaints) in addition to the 
full set of deviant officers (named in at least one misconduct complaint), allowing us to disentangle 
what initially leads officers into misconduct, and how deviant and non-deviant partnership 
structures offending.18 Our interpretation is therefore limited to the extent to which their known 
deviant colleagues (with at least one formal misconduct complaint) have engaged in excessive use 
of force. Officers operate within established institutions and are typically assigned to partners, or 
units and/or communities where they are more likely to interact with some officers more than 
others. These structural constraints on the interactions between officers may lead to a limited set 
of colleagues playing a prominent role in their socialization in the force. Thus, our measure of 
exposure to deviant peers may be exaggerated if they have a high number of non-problematic 
partnerships that are not captured in our dataset.  
 
Finally, the results of the study are based on one agency and lack organizational-level 
indicators of change. Results based on a single agency limits external validity, and the ability to 
generalize to other contexts and places. The CPD represents a case study whose high levels of 
misconduct led to a major inquiry by the Department of Justice, an overhaul of the complaint 
oversight body, and the appointment of a new police superintendent. Chicago, in many ways, has 
similar patterns to other large cities that have been under consent decrees such as Los Angeles, 
Cleveland, Miami, Newark, Baltimore, and New Orleans. The high levels of impunity of officers 
in Chicago may shape how these social norms are transmitted between officers in the CPD, and 
potentially enable a subculture that predisposes officers to act in ways that they would not have 
had they been employed in another sector where punishment was more certain, or officer cynicism 
was low. Lacking information about changes in organizational-level indicators over time may be 
 
frailty models; however, they did not converge. This does mean that there is a potential for biased standard errors 
and false-positives. We thus urge caution in the interpretation of these results. 
16 To effect model comparisons, we also re-estimated the original model (Table 2, Model II) with only 40,773 
police-observations. The log-likelihood of this model was -57,585.33 (p < .001) and AIC 120,129.53, which 
suggests that adding in measures of crime and collective disadvantage did not improve model fit. 
17 When we control for crime-count and concentrated disadvantage our results show that Hispanic officers are 
significantly more likely to be involved in recurrent use of force complaints. However, we attribute this as an 
artefact of the data, rather than capturing a significant relationship. According to bivariate analyses, individuals with 
missing data on this measure appear to be slightly different than individuals who have complete data.  Hispanic 
officers were more likely to be recorded on complaints that had missing data on the police beat in which the incident 
occurred (p < .01), whereas White officers were more likely to be listed on complaints that had recorded data for the 
police beat (p < .01). Further, Hispanic officers who had a use of force complaint, were less likely to be excluded (p 
< .01), whereas White officers with a use of force complaint were more likely to be excluded (p < .01). 
18 This limit characterizes much of the literature on co-offending that relies on arrest data that only captures 
“deviant” peers rather than others in one’s interpersonal networks.  
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an important limitation given that misconduct has been attributed to the organization size of the 
department, the percentage of officers relative to supervisors, the internal operations of the agency, 
and training or hiring process (Huff, White, and Decker, 2018; Kappeler et al., 1998). On a larger 
scale, political culture, policy, or enforcement objectives, which often go unmeasured, are reflected 
in the structural makeup of the organization and may have an impact on the prevalence of 
misconduct over time. Nonetheless, our central hypotheses about the importance of officer 
networks readily invites comparative research that can assess the importance of officer networks 
within and across different police organizational contexts. Opportunities for collecting social 
network data within police departments are plentiful but require a desire and commitment by police 
departments to engage in such a research process. Future investigations may collect social network 
data using information on police partnerships, the units they are assigned to, and even academy 
classes, allowing examinations to tease out how various relationships structure officer behavior. 
 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
 Our study is one of the first to use formal network methods to measure how social 
relationships within an entire police department impacts the likelihood of misconduct. Similar to 
the ways that networks have been shown to influence criminal behavior in other contexts, our 
findings highlight one-way social networks may shape deviance within police departments: 
through exposure to deviant officers. While our study cannot pinpoint the exact mechanism 
through which misconduct diffuses through police networks, it suggests that networks might very 
well play a role in shaping how behavioral scripts influence police work through interactions 
between colleagues in the field (Fagan and Geller, 2015; Roithmayr, 2016; Sierra-Arévalo, 2016; 
Skolnick, 1966). Our study reinforces previous findings and gives further credence to the theory 
of social contagion of police excessive use of force brought forward by Roithmayr (2016) and 
others. Future research in this vein would do well to gather and analyze social network data 
depicting the informal social structure of police departments as well as try to pinpoint precise 
mechanisms of contagion such as learning, imitation, and so on. As bounded organizations, police 
departments are ideal settings to collect and study social networks. Such data would enable 
researchers to not only consider the content of social networks, but also the structural features of 
these networks.  
 
 The finding that officers’ misconduct networks influence their own involvement in use of 
force complaints carries some significant policy implications. The finding that being named on a 
complaint with female officers reduces the future likelihood of use of force complaints suggests 
that greater exposure to female officers in an officers’ network could lead to a reduction in 
misconduct incidents. Schuck (2014) suggested that female officers are less likely to internalize 
hypermasculine values prevalent in police culture during the occupational socialization process 
and that the growing place of women in police departments may disrupt the traditional masculine 
culture of policing. Our findings suggest that female officers may not only be less likely to be 
involved in use of force complaints themselves, but their association with male officers may also 
reduce their likelihood of future use of force complaints among other officers. In other words, 





Similarly, the effect of tenure is consistent with prior findings that consider officer age and 
experience. Multiple studies have found that relatively younger, less experienced, officers are 
likelier to make arrests and to be involved in disciplinary action (Brandl et al., 2001; Crank, 1993; 
Sherman, 1980). In contrast, and consistent with our findings, officers who are more experienced, 
and have been on the force over a longer period are less likely to be named in use of force 
complaints. Perhaps the tendency for “youth” to make more arrests and resort to improper use of 
force is centered on hypermasculine values that facilitate a “kick ass” reputation (Toch, 1995), a 
scenario which may be aggravated if newer officers with more physical prowess are also those 
who are more likely to be called to a scene. When a lack of experience and pressure to perform are 
combined, new officers may be inclined to overcompensate (e.g., prove themselves) to impress 
their peers and mitigate fear and safety concerns as they become socialized into police (sub)culture 
on the job. Findings such as this highlight the importance of adequate academy training as well as 
the important role of field training officers (FTOs) in socializing recruits to the departments set of 
values, principles, and code of ethics (see Getty, Worrall and Morris, 2014). Importantly, our 
findings on the length of such risk (e.g., Figure 4) further suggest that such socialization may 
continue well into the first decade on the job—such a focus on “youth” is thus not just on the 
newest recruits. It is imperative that departments monitor FTOs, recruits, and officers with due 
attention placed on which officers are conducting the training, their rank, and their overall status 
and reputation across the department and in the community. 
 
The most salient policy implication of this study relates to the social influence of officers 
with a prior history of use of force complaints. Not only are officers with a prior history of being 
named in use of force complaints more likely to be involved in future similar complaints, but they 
appear to also influence others in being named in use of force complaints. Many early warning 
systems have been designed to account for the former (history of complaints) but fail to consider 
the latter (the social networks of officers involved in misconduct). Although further research is 
needed before one could claim that police misconduct is truly socially “contagious”, our findings 
provide evidence that exposure to officers with a history of misconduct is associated with 
subsequent use of force behavior. Police departments seeking to curb use of force complaints may 
want to consider how assigning officers with such histories of use of force could impact the 
behavior of other officers. For example, temporarily removing officers named in use of force 
complaints from the field until problematic behaviors are addressed might limit the negative 
consequences of exposure. Likewise, the significance of our exposure parameter suggests that 
departments might also limit the number of officers with histories of use of force complaints from 
working as partners or in the same unit. These findings raise options for expanding already 
implemented prevention mechanisms. Previous studies have shown that early warning systems, 
which first identify potentially problematic officers and then divert them into non-disciplinary 
programs, such as counselling and retraining, can be effective measures for reducing civilian 
allegations of misconduct (e.g., see Walker, Alpert, and Kenney, 2001). The CPD currently has 
multiple early warning systems in place, some of which include measures to re-assign problematic 
officers (e.g. see Police Accountability Task Force, 2016). Our study recommends expanding these 
early warning systems to account for officers’ network characteristics, particularly to account for 
clustering of problematic behaviors. If early problematic behaviors are detected, restructuring 
assignments may reduce the negative social influence we find in this study.19  
 
19 The CPD currently has multiple early warning systems in place, and a history of adopting innovative and cutting-




Individual incidents of police misconduct and violence—even those like the shooting of 
Laquan McDonald—represent more than a debate between bad apples and bad institutions. Officer 
Jason Van Dyke fired the 16 shots that killed McDonald and he had a history of abusive behaviors. 
Yet, his act occurred among a department with a long history of abuse, misconduct, and a lingering 
code of silence that kept many of the other officers on the scene from acting in accordance with 
the fundamental police mandate to “protect and serve.” A network approach to police misconduct 
can provide new ways to help us understand the social contexts that can lead to such tragic events.  
What is more, detecting and doing something about the types of network effects that facilitate 
police misconduct can possibly help repair the severely damaged relationship between the police 
and community in cities like Chicago. Legal authorities, especially the police, shape the behavior 
and reaction of the communities they police, and in return, the public’s reactions to the police 
impact their ability to efficiently and effectively maintain social order and combat crime. Tankebe 
(2009:261) explains that “what poor police treatment of citizens does is to weaken moral 
identification with police institutions.” Ultimately being treated fairly by those in positions of 
power and authority impacts the public’s view of legitimacy, group conformity, and their level of 
voluntary cooperation with, and in support of, legal societal norms (Tyler, 2004; Tyler and Huo, 
2002). 
 
 Police misconduct diminishes the public’s willingness to cooperate and engage with the 
police (Desmond et al., 2016) – exacerbating attitudes that resemble legal cynicism (Kirk and 
Papachristos, 2011), and thus, indirectly affecting perceptions of police legitimacy. Our findings 
call for innovations in the management and facilitation of police services, heightened levels (and 
expectations) of professionalism, and greater accountability (e.g., meaningful departmental 
discipline (e.g., Kelling and Coles, 1996; Silverman and O’Connell, 1999). While such efforts 
should be applied across the recruitment and training phases of police careers, our study also 
suggests that interventions must move beyond a focus on individual officers and, instead, also 
incorporate methods to detect and dissipate the effects of deviant police networks within police 
departments. This raises a call for greater transparency and accountability across agencies so that 
officers are monitored and placed through training programs such as integrity testing that can 
insulate, identify, and then correct the behaviors of officers with a propensity for wrong-doing 
(e.g., Macintyre and Prenzler, 1999). A step further would be to isolate highly problematic officers 
that appear to be unresponsive to sanctions from their larger network of peers and provide 
interventions that account for the influence of both community-level and organizational correlates 
of misconduct. 
  
Some of the policy recommendations and implications of our finding—such as increases 
to transparency and oversight—require large investments of political capital of cities and police 
departments. In some cases, like Chicago, such requirements are being wrapped into consent 
decrees and overseen by the court. Changes in the cultural aspects of the police worldview are also 
needed to help address the ways in which norms and learning unfold within departments and are 
 
problem officers are easily identifiable, and often well-known, there has been a failure to systematically implement 
diversion programs to correct officer behavior (Police Accountability Task Force, 2016).  As with any early warning 
system, the effectiveness will be contingent upon distinguishing between symbolic gestures of adoption versus 




likely to necessitate changes not readily discussed here. But many of the network interventions 
described above—such as the allocation of current officers by experience or prior history of use 
of force—do not require large-scale policy changes; these sorts of changes can be done at the 
management level within willing police departments. The sorts of data analyzed here can readily 
be gathered and analyzed from within management systems. The biggest challenge to this sort of 
network approach is the willingness of departments to dive into their own data (or build positive 
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Failure to provide service 
Complaint 2 
Arrest, improper procedures 
Complaint 3 
Use of Force 
Number of officers accused 
in current complaint 
4 3 3 
Number of officers in ego’s 
misconduct network with a 
UOF complaint (t-x) 
- 0 2 
Number of officers in ego’s 
misconduct network (t-x) 
- 3 4 
Ego’s network exposure - 0% 50% 
ABBREVIATIONS: UOF = Use of Force 








Figure 2. Distribution of Police Misconduct Complaints, 2007-2015 
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Figure 3. Frequency of Misconduct Complaints across Officers, 2007-2015a,b
 
Number of Complaints 
 
a All complaints: Percentages represent the number of complaints received by the officers in our sample (n = 8,624) 
b Use of force complaints: Percentages represent the number of complaints received by the officers in our sample 
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Figure 4. Hazard Ratios for Average Officera Over Values of Officer Tenure (top) with 
Variable Probability Density Function (bottom) 
 
 
a Simulated using average values of continuous variables and the following values for categorical variables: male, 
white, police officer, and not  member of a special unit. 
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Figure 5. Hazard Ratios for Average Officera over Values of Exposure to Use of Force (left) 
and Percent Female in Complaint Network (right) with Variable Probability Density 
Function (bottom) 
 
a Simulated using average values of continuous variables and the following values for categorical variables: male, 
white, police officer, and not  member of a special unit. 
ABBREVIATIONS: UOF = Use of force 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics  
Variables         Mean           SD Minimum Maximum 
Officer     
  Use of force (1 = Yes) 0.18 0.39 0 1 
  Sex (1 = Male) 0.86 0.34 0 1 
  Race     
    White 0.52 0.50 0 1 
    Black  0.24 0.43 0 1 
    Hispanic 0.21 0.41 0 1 
    Other 0.03 0.17 0 1 
  Tenure 11.29 6.74 0 56 
  Rank (1 = Officer) 0.79 0.41 0 1 
  Special unit (1 = Yes) 0.15 0.36 0 1 
  N solo complaints 1.57 2.26 0 34 
  N prior UOF complaints 1.23 1.90 0 22 
  Incident year 2010.67              2.37 2007 2015 
Misconduct network     
  N co-accused 2.24 3.09 0 14 
  Female (%) 0.14 0.27 0 1 
  Same race (%) 0.43 0.44 0 1 
  Tenure (mean) 7.80 6.69 0 64 
  Exposure to UOF 0.39 0.34 0 1 
No. Observations: 43,718 
 
   
No. Officers: 8,624 
 
   




Table 2. Frailty Models Assessing the Influence of Colleagues Accused of Misconduct on 
Officer Use of Force Complaintsa 
 Model I Model II 
 HR      95% CI HR      95% CI 
Officer       
  Sex (1 = Male) 1.79 *** 1.60-1.99 1.19 * 1.03-1.38 
  Race (ref = White)       
     Black  1.05  0.96-1.15 1.02  0.94-1.11 
     Hispanic 1.09  0.99-1.20 1.09  0.99-1.19 
     Other 1.02  0.82-1.26 1.02  0.83-1.24 
  Tenure 0.85 *** 0.84-0.87 0.87 *** 0.85-0.88 
  Tenure^2b 1.35 *** 1.28-1.42 1.30 *** 1.24-1.36 
  Rank (1 = Officer) 0.92  0.84-1.01 0.90 * 0.82-0.98 
  Special unit 0.93  0.83-1.04 1.04  0.94-1.15 
  N solo complaints 1.07 *** 1.05-1.09 1.05 *** 1.03-1.07 
  N prior UOF complaints 0.93 *** 0.91-0.95 0.93 *** 0.92-0.95 
  Incident year 0.38 *** 0.37-0.39 0.38 *** 0.37-0.39 
Misconduct network       
  N co-accused    0.91 *** 0.90-0.92 
  Female (%)  –  0.57 *** 0.48-0.67 
  Same race (%)  –  1.02  0.95-1.08 
  Tenure (mean)  –  1.00  0.99-1.00 
  Exposure to UOFc  –  1.66 *** 1.52-1.81 
Theta  0.85   0.67  
N observations  43,718  43,718 
N officers  8,624  8,624 
LL  -61,256.46***  -61,432.89*** 
AIC  128,536.06  128,134.01 
ABBREVIATIONS: AIC = Akaike information criterion; HR = hazard ratio; CI = confidence intervals; LL = log-
likelihood; RE = Random Effects; UOF = Use of force 
a HR = exp(b) 
b Tenure squared was divided by 100 to facilitate interpretation. 
c Proportion co-accused with prior use of force complaint 




Table A. Correlation Matrix (n = 43,718 officer-complaint observations) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Use of Force 1 -               
2 Male 0.06 1 -              
3 White 0.00 0.06 1 -             
4 Black -0.02 -0.12 -0.58 1 -            
5 Hispanic 0.01 0.03 -0.54 -0.29 1 -           
6 Other 0.01 0.04 -0.18 -0.10 -0.09 1 -          
7 Tenure -0.10 0.01 0.00 0.10 -0.08 -0.05 1 -         
8 Rank 0.03 -0.03 -0.13 0.07 0.07 0.03 -0.36 1 -        
9 Special unit 0.00 0.08 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.10 0.09 1 -       
10 N solo 0.01 0.01 -0.09 0.13 -0.03 0.01 0.20 0.01 -0.07 1 -      
11 N prior UOF 0.07 0.13 0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.06 0.07 0.49 1 -     
12 Incident year -0.10 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.21 0.04 -0.05 0.21 0.23 1     
13 N co-accused -0.10 0.08 0.06 -0.09 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.21 -0.20 -0.03 -0.11 1 -   
14 % Female -0.07 -0.79 -0.08 0.13 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.10 0.00 -0.11 0.03 -0.09 1 -  
15 % Same race -0.01 0.03 0.24 -0.06 -0.16 -0.15 -0.10 0.03 0.03 -0.21 0.01 -0.03 0.15 -0.03 1 - 
16 Tenure (mean) -0.07 0.02 0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.13 -0.03 0.06 -0.21 -0.01 0.11 0.33 -0.03 0.39 1 
17 Exposure to UOF 0.05 0.09 0.02 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.12 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.39 0.25 -0.02 -0.08 0.04 0.01 
ABBREVIATIONS: UOF = Use of force
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Table B. Correlation Matrix (n = 40,773 officer-complaint observations) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 Use of Force 1 -                 
2 Male 0.06 1 -                
3 White 0.00 0.06 1 -               
4 Black -0.02 -0.12 -0.59 1 -              
5 Hispanic 0.01 0.03 -0.54 -0.29 1 -             
6 Other 0.01 0.04 -0.18 -0.10 -0.09 1 -            
7 Tenure -0.09 0.01 0.00 0.10 -0.09 -0.05 1 -           
8 Rank 0.02 -0.03 -0.13 0.07 0.07 0.03 -0.36 1 -          
9 Special unit 0.00 0.08 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.10 0.09 1 -         
10 N solo 0.01 0.01 -0.09 0.14 -0.03 0.01 0.21 0.00 -0.06 1 -        
11 N prior UOF 0.07 0.13 0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.06 0.07 0.49 1 -       
12 Incident year -0.10 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.22 0.04 -0.05 0.22 0.23 1 -      
13 Crime count 0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.10 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.01 1 -     
14 Concentrated   
     disadvantage 
0.01 0.02 -0.09 0.12 -0.01 -0.03 -0.19 0.01 0.14 -0.02 0.07 -0.04 0.23 1 -    
15 N co-accused -0.11 0.08 0.06 -0.09 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.21 -0.20 -0.03 -0.12 0.01 0.14 1 -   
16 % Female -0.07 -0.79 -0.08 0.13 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.10 0.01 -0.12 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.09 1 -  
17 % Same race -0.01 0.03 0.24 -0.06 -0.17 -0.15 -0.10 0.03 0.03 -0.21 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.05 0.14 -0.03 1 - 
18 Tenure (mean) -0.08 0.02 0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.14 -0.02 0.06 -0.20 -0.01 0.12 -0.05 -0.05 0.32 -0.03 0.38 1 
19 Exposure to UOF 0.05 0.09 0.02 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.12 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.39 0.25 0.05 0.09 -0.02 -0.08 0.04 0.01 
ABBREVIATIONS: UOF = Use of force
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Table C. Summary Statistics for Measure of Concentrated Disadvantage 
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Single female households (%) 0.22 0.13 0.04 0.43 
18-year-old or less (%) 0.23 0.07 0.08 0.31 
Receiving food stamps (%) 0.18 0.11 0.05 0.37 
Black (%) 0.42 0.37 0.01 0.97 
Below poverty line (%) 0.23 0.09 0.09 0.43 
Unemployed (%) 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.29 
Concentrated disadvantage 0.00 2.30 -3.25 4.47 
ABBREVIATIONS: SD = Standard deviation    
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Table D. Frailty Models Assessing the Influence of Colleagues Accused of Misconduct on 
Officer Use of Force Complaints with controls for Beat and District-level Indicatorsa 
 HR      95% CI 
Officer    
  Sex (1 = Male) 1.19 * 1.03-1.39 
  Race (ref = White)    
     Black  0.99  0.91-1.08 
     Hispanic 1.10 * 1.01-1.20 
     Other 1.02  0.83-1.25 
  Tenure 0.88 *** 0.86-0.89 
  Tenure^2b 1.28 *** 1.22-1.34 
  Rank (1 = Officer) 0.91 * 0.83-0.99 
  Special unit 1.04  0.94-1.15 
  N solo complaints 1.06 *** 1.04-1.08 
  N prior UOF complaints 0.94 *** 0.92-0.96 
  Incident year 0.38 *** 0.37-0.40 
  Crime count (beat-level) 1.05  0.97-1.12 
  Concentrated disadvantage               
  (district-level) 
1.02 * 1.00-1.03 
Misconduct network    
  N co-accused 0.91 *** 0.90-0.92 
  Female (%) 0.57 *** 0.48-0.67 
  Same race (%) 1.01  0.95-1.08 
  Tenure (mean) 1.00  0.99-1.00 
  Exposure to UOFc 1.69 *** 1.54-1.85 
Theta  0.65 
N observations  40,773 
N officers  8,430 
LL  -57,593.98*** 
AIC  120,122.16 
ABBREVIATIONS: AIC = Akaike information criterion; HR = hazard ratio; CI = confidence intervals; LL = log-
likelihood; RE = Random Effects; UOF = Use of force 
a HR = exp(b) 
b Tenure squared was divided by 100 to facilitate interpretation. 
c Proportion co-accused with prior use of force complaint 
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